Tuesday, December 8, 2009
Sunday, December 6, 2009
Wise Words From Warren
GW: What is your plan to lead New Orleans out of the current crime wave, and how will you make the city safer in 2007?
RILEY: We have reformatted the New Orleans Police Department in the aftermath of Katrina. We have put some very serious plans in place that unfortunately have been diminished because of our attrition rate. Today our department has 1,401 officers, which includes 41 recruits. We have 107 officers that are out sick. We’re operating a department with about 1,200-and-something officers. And that has hurt us.
GW: Some people would naturally suspect that things wouldn’t be this bad unless some police officers were either working with drug dealers or turning the other way. And that’s a terrible thing to allege because we don’t sit here with any evidence. But people just, when they reach a level of frustration or even fear, they begin to harbor the darkest thoughts. What assurances can you give the public that NOPD is honest?
RILEY: I can’t vouch for 100 percent of the officers being honest. We have some corrupt cops. I don’t think we have the level that we had during the Len Davis days. We have run more integrity checks than any previous administration has ever run. We have done sting operations. And we have fired more people than any other police administration has done within the first year. We are targeting individuals. We have taken swift and decisive action.
Now, what you don’t hear is that we terminated them because under this administration, when they’re caught, they resign because they already know the outcome. … We have taken a no-tolerance policy. We have run undercover operations. We have set up drug houses where we’ve set dope up for officers to go in to see what they’re going to do. We have done a number of sting operations not only to instill professionalism, but also paranoia into the minds of the few who might consider doing something wrong. We want them to think twice about committing a crime because it might be us; it might be the FBI.
We have FBI agents assigned to public integrity that are working with us. There are some things that I am seeking with the Department of Justice as it relates to some activities within the New Orleans Police Department. All I can do is tell you that the public needs to know that this administration is doing everything that it can to ensure that this department does the right thing.
To our surprise, with all the sting operations and all that we have done and all the people that we have fired, there are still a handful out there that will take a chance and do something wrong. And that’s unfortunate. But I guess it comes with the territory.
GW: You and police chiefs before you — and many officers — have found yourselves at odds with the DA’s office from time to time. Tensions have heightened since the indictments of the Danziger Seven. Tell us how your relationship with Eddie Jordan has evolved since you first took office and how well do you think you’ll work with that office going forward.
RILEY: We’re going to be fine as it relates to working together. The DA’s Office and the New Orleans Police Department, as you mentioned, have historically had some difficulties in certain areas.
GW: It’s been kind of a blame game going back and forth.
RILEY: And for far too long, for far too long. And let me say this: as it relates to the New Orleans Police Department, we have sent our officers to report writing training, investigative training. We’ve done everything that we can over this last year to make sure our people are preparing the best cases, providing the best evidence.
The relationship between Mr. Jordan and myself is fine. As it relates to the implementation of the processes that go from NOPD with a case to the DA’s office, it isn’t quite where it needs to be yet.
I’ll give you an example. We have suggested, and we would like Mr. Jordan’s office to, when a homicide occurs, get involved from the very beginning. Come to the scene, the collection of evidence. If our detectives are missing something, for them to say “You need to take a photo of this. You need to bring that piece of evidence in.” We want them to be a part of the entire process. We invite them to do that.
We want to ensure that our cases are submitted within 60 days, which we are doing. We also want them to understand as it relates to crime analysis information that it takes more than 60 days. If someone is in a violent crime and we have to send blood samples away because we don’t have a crime lab, that’s going to take some time to get back. … We can write a report in 60 days, but we can’t say that drug analyses are going to come back in 60 days. We can’t say that blood splatter results are going to come back within 60 days. It’s out of our hands.
But the relationship going forward, as it relates to Mr. Jordan and me, we’re fine. It’s not a personal thing. From the Danziger incident, certainly Mr. Jordan made some comments, and I certainly made some comments. But that was it. That was over with. Mr. Jordan and I met last Saturday. We are working together. We’re going to do everything that we can to make sure that we do all that we can to make this city safe. The relationship simply needs to be tweaked where everybody’s on the same page. And that’s something that we’re working to get done.
GW: The local president of the Fraternal Order of Police says the Danziger Bridge case could put a damper on recruiting. At the same time, the local NAACP president says police demonstrations for the accused officers can have a chilling effect on witnesses. What’s your take on the impact of this case on the department and on the community?
RILEY: I’m not going to make any comments of any sort on the Danziger. I don’t want to do anything that’s prejudicial.
GW: The mayor recently said that racial tensions have increased since the storm. It’s often said that a police department should reflect the community it serves. What do you believe is the state of race relations within the department?
RILEY: We had some serious issues after the [mayoral] election within the department along racial lines. The department was divided down racial lines as a result of the election. And it is certainly better now, much better now than it was immediately following the election. There was some severe separation. And I think that’s sort of come back together. Within any organization you’re going to have some racial issues, I believe. And we have some, but it’s not significant. But we do have some issues.
GW: How prepared is NOPD for the next major hurricane, and what will you and the department do differently?
RILEY: We’re very prepared. The difference is before we were prepared for a hurricane. We weren’t prepared for a levee break. We weren’t prepared for water to cover 80 percent of the city. Now our emergency preparedness plans are for a catastrophe, not just for an emergency. We have sufficient boats now. We have training from our intelligence units and our Criminal Intelligence Bureau and our Special Operations Division. We were never the lead on water rescue; the fire department was. But we have a bigger role in that now, although the fire department is still the lead.
As it relates to communications, we have our new radios in. … That new radio has the ability to turn a channel and we can talk to anyone in the state. So in the event that our current system goes down, we turn to another channel [and] we can communicate with the FBI, with DEA. We can communicate with Lake Charles, Shreveport. We will have the ability to talk to each other through those systems that are around the state. So that will never ever be a problem again.
GW: Part of getting past a catastrophe like that is looking back at what went right and what could have been improved upon. Did anyone at any level issue a shoot-to-kill order during Katrina?
RILEY: No, no.
GW: Was martial law ever declared? And if so, on whose orders?
RILEY: Martial law was never declared, just a state of emergency.
GW: The Metropolitan Crime Commission says the city needs to form a special commission with vast powers to investigate what happened after Katrina. Would you welcome such an investigation?
RILEY: I would. I believe that the U.S. Senate investigators did a detailed investigation. I don’t know what could be any more thorough than that, but I would have no objection to it. It’s an open book. Whatever’s going to identify problems and improvements is welcome.
GW: Chief, this interview is going to be published the week of January 15, which is your birthday. Happy birthday. At the same time, we couldn’t help but notice that in the year you were born [1959] there were only 59 murders, and the city had more than 600,000 people. What would it take if we were to set that as a goal? How would we get back to a number like that?
RILEY: An education system that was anywhere near what it was back then. An economy that was thriving. A poverty level far lower than the 27 percent that it was pre-Katrina. Opportunities where our impoverished youth didn’t feel their life was useless and that they were going to live beyond 25 years of age because they were educated and had opportunities. And a criminal justice system that, when you’ve committed a crime and it was proven, you go to jail and you do your time.
DA Press Release- What did the government have to say?
Press Release- Leon Cannizzaro, Jr., District Attorney of New Orleans
Issued 12/28/06 (before charges were later dropped)
Source: City of New Orleans
Seven Police Officers Indicted for Shooting Deaths on Danziger Bridge
| Today, on December 28, 2006, the Orleans Parish Special Grand Jury indicted seven New Orleans police officers for their involvement in the shooting deaths of two people and the critical wounding of four others on the Danziger Bridge, in the days following Hurricane Katrina. The shooting incident stemmed from reports of rescue workers hearing gunfire and reports of an officer being injured from gunfire while on the I-10 bridge over the Industrial Canal. Seventh District police officers Kenneth Bowen, Anthony Villavaso, Robert Gisevius, Robert Faulcon, Michael Hunter, Robert Barrios, and Ignatius Hills responded to the call. The officers encountered the Bartholomew family at the base of the Danziger Bridge and the Madison family near the top of the bridge. These officers shot and killed two people and critically wounded four people on September 4, 2005. Sergeant Kenneth Bowen was charged with one count of First Degree Murder of James Brissette and seven counts of Attempted First Degree Murder of Leonard Bartholomew III, Susan Bartholomew, Lesha Bartholomew, Jose Holmes, Jr., Lance Madison and Ronald Madison. Sergeant Robert Gisevius was charged with one count of First Degree Murder of James Brissette and two counts of Attempted First Degree Murder of Lance Madison and Ronald Madison. Officer Anthony Villavaso was charged with one count of First Degree Murder of James Brissette and four counts of Attempted First Degree Murder of Leonard Bartholomew III, Susan Bartholomew, Lesha Bartholomew, and Jose Holmes, Jr. Officer Robert Faulcon was charged with two counts of First Degree Murder of James Brissette and Ronald Madison as well as Attempted First Degree Murder of Leonard Bartholomew, Susan Bartholomew, Lesha Bartholomew and Jose Holmes, Jr. Officer Robert Barrios was charged with four counts of Attempted First Degree Murder of Leonard Bartholomew III, Susan Bartholomew, Lesha Bartholomew and Jose Holmes, Jr. Officer Michael Hunter was charged with two counts of Attempted First Degree Murder of Lance Madison and Ronald Madison. Officer Ignatius Hills was charged with one count of Attempted Second Degree Murder of Leonard Bartholomew IV. Following the shooting deaths by the New Orleans police officers, Lance Madison, whose brother Ronald was slain on the bridge, was arrested and charged with numerous offenses, including attempted murder. Today the Orleans Parish Special Grand Jury returned a no true bill as to Lance Madison, effectively refusing to indict Madison for any crime. Orleans Parish District Attorney Eddie J. Jordan Jr. said, “We cannot allow our police officers to shoot and kill our citizens without justification like rabid dogs. The rules governing the use of lethal force are not suspended during a state of emergency. Everyone, including police officers, must abide by the law of the land.”  Eddie J. Jordan, New Orleans Parish District Attorney |
Monday, November 30, 2009
"A duty dodged is like a debt unpaid; it is only deferred, and we must come back and settle the account at last."- Joseph Fort Newton
Accountability. You've heard the word. You know it's a good thing. You know we need it in New Orleans. But what is it? And how can we get it?
Accountability: "It is a fundamental principal of a democratic society that the police should be held to account for their actions. Accountability includes both what the police do and how they perform. Agency-level accountability involves the performance of law enforcement agencies with respect to controlling crime and disorder and providing services to the public (National Institute of Justice, 1999). Individual-level accountability involves the conduct of police officers with respect to lawful, respectful, and equal treatment of citizens."- Samuel Walker, National Institute of Justice
Walker's analysis of police accountability focuses on the following set of accountability procedures:
- Having firm policies regarding the authority involved in the office of a police officer
- Encouraging supervisors to routinely monitor officers
- Regulated evaluations of individual officer performance
- Programs that are designed to intercept performance problems before they begin
- Strict policies relating to allegations of misconduct or infractions by officers
These procedures could serve as a basis for encouraging transparency within the N.O.P.D. Although the force is strained in the post-Katrina environment, policies on hiring should not become more flexible. It is important to ensure that each new officer hired passes rigorous background checks, psychological testing, and intensive training courses before they are permitted to join the force. Each officer, even those that have been in the force for many years, should be trained annually about the meaning and importance of being a police officer. The more these officers understand the significance behind their position and how imperative accountability is to what they do, the more likely they are to not only move away from corruption, but also to encourage their fellow officers to follow their example. This is what we call in international development projects, a bottom up approach to solving a problem. This means that the education is done from within a community, rather than from a higher source (which is called a top down approach).
Supervisors should also be monitoring their officers more carefully and doing routine performance evaluations. The officers who do not meet strict standards, including mental, physical, and emotional evaluations, should not be allowed to serve within the force. Officers should also be required to participate in anti-corruption diversion programs that would be targeted at stopping corruption before it occurs. These programs could include subjects such as safety, financial management, community involvement, youth education, and disaster management. Strict consequences, such as probation and loss of privileges, should be implemented for any allegations of misconduct. Officers who have been accused of serious crimes, such as murder and rape, should not be allowed to return to the force.
Henry Glover: Victim of the N.O.P.D.?
Edna Glover, Mother of Henry Glover, 31. His charred remains were found in September 2009, about a week after Hurricane Katrina made landfall."The things that happened with the police department during Katrina were shocking. They were disturbing. I wish I could say they were aberrant. But they were not. They are what happens when you have a department that is deeply troubled."- Mary Howell, civil rights attorney in New Orleans, The Nation
This video shows the charred remains of Henry Glover, including his skull complete with a gaping hole, in a burnt out car. The scenes in the video were taken by two Pittsburgh private detectives who came to New Orleans following Katrina to help out with security. It includes Nagin's first public comments about the case, in which a reporter asks Nagin if it concerns him that it took the N.O.P.D. over three years to investigate the death of Henry Glover after his remains were first discovered. Nagin was unsympathetic, saying "Well, we had a little event called Hurricane Katrina, so it took us a little time to get through all the issues. We've had many claims, but this one seems like it has a little more legs and, therefore, the FBI is involved." - The Pittsburgh Channel
Remains of Henry Glover were found in this car on the levee near the New Orleans 4th District Police Station, Times-PicayuneYes, the F.B.I. is definitely involved. In fact, the case is the subject of a federal probe into the N.O.P.D., which has included questioning witnesses and officers involved and seizing files from the N.O.P.D.'s homicide division. Multiple New Orleans police officers are being questioned in connection to the case.
On September 2, 2005, Henry Glover was shot in Algiers by an unknown assailant (possibly even an N.O.P.D. officer, as questioned by the Times- Picayune). William Tanner was driving nearby in his 2002 white Chevy Malibu, when he came across a bleeding Glover, along with Glover's friend Bernard Calloway and Glover's brother Edward King, who explained to Tanner what happened and begged for help. Tanner, a complete stranger, agreed and decided that Glover was too wounded to make it to the nearest hospital. Instead, he drove Glover and the other men to Paul B. Habans Elementary School. The N.O.P.D. had set up a temporary base for their SWAT team at the school, and Tanner thought they would be able to provide Glover with a faster route to medical help. But this is where their devastating situation became even worse. (story first reported by The Nation)
"You wear a badge that says protect and serve. Who were you serving at this time?"- William Tanner, WDSU
(Photo: Nola.com)
The N.O.P.D. officers were not protecting or serving these citizens of New Orleans. They assumed Glover had been shot because he had been looting, and treated the men like criminals. The men pleaded with the officers to help Glover, who remained wounded in the backseat of Tanner's car, but instead the three other men were handcuffed by the officers. The men say five white officers were present, and they ignored the bleeding Glover and spent the next twenty minutes beating and berating the three men. "Tanner and King say that they, along with Calloway, were seated on a bench and cuffed while a swarm of officers punched, slapped and berated them" (The Nation). According to Tanner's account, he was even beat in the face with an assault rifle.
Once the officers were done beating the men, they let them go but kept Tanner's car, saying it was now under police custody. The last time Tanner saw his car intact, with the body of Henry Glover still in the backseat, was as one of the officers with two emergency flares in his pocket, drove away from the station. The car, or the burned remains of what once was the car, was found six days later less than one mile from the elementary school where the incident took place, complete with charred human remains and a partial burnt skull in the back seat. When the remains were turned over to the coroner, no skull accompanied the bone fragments, and it is still missing today. This video and all other evidence are now in custody of the F.B.I. The evidence is expected to be presented to a grand jury soon.
Accountability for these officers is extremely imperative. This crime has witness accounts, physical evidence, and motive. The evidence illustrates that the officers involved burned the car in an attempt to destroy the evidence, the body. If these Pittsburgh detectives had not stumbled upon the body with their video camera, it is unlikely that this case would have ever gained enough momentum to be investigated by the F.B.I. Even though it is four years later and this makes the case more difficult to prove, it should be considered before its statute of limitations comes about, and while witness testimonies can still be considered credible. If these officers are indicted on murder charges for this case, it could help the Danziger Bridge case be brought to justice as well.
Saturday, November 28, 2009
9/11 & Hurricane Katrina: A Comparison of Police Actions
"When the flooding started in New Orleans the response was delayed. There was no one available to help the victims of Katrina when the hurricane hit New Orleans. Just minutes after the first plane hit the north tower of the World Trade Center, New York firefighters [and police officers] hurried to the scene. Where was the help when New Orleans was flooding? Who was there to help the citizens from drowning?"- Saharra White, Associated Content
A New Orleans police officer amongst the chaos of the Superdome on September 1, 2005. http://outhouserag.typepad.com/photos/uncategorized/522.jpg
A New Orleans police officer amongst the chaos of the Superdome on September 1, 2005. http://outhouserag.typepad.com/photos/uncategorized/522.jpg
Two female NYPD officers--September 11, 2001.
Hurricane Katrina and the September 11 terrorist attacks. The former, a natural disaster that was predicted and known of, and the latter an attack on our nation that no one saw coming. Both affected major American cities and each had over 1,000 fatalities. So why were the responses so different? Granted, these are very different types of events, yet both required immediate emergency assistance to save the lives of American citizens. Both affected our nation deeply and changed the history of their respective cities in a huge way.
An analysis performed by a consulting firm, McKinsey & Co., in 2002, highlighted the highs and lows of the response of the NYPD following the 9/11 attacks in New York City. Many of the conclusions are eerily similar to the analyses of the NOPD following Hurricane Katrina four years later. Perhaps the NOPD would have been well served to read this analysis and apply it to their own force before their questionable attempt at relief following the storm.
Highlights of the analysis (Blue)
Personal Commentary and Comparisons to Katrina (Red)
- "The New York Police Department's response to the Sept. 11 attack was effective in many areas but suffered from lapses in leadership and coordination and a lack of proper planning and training."
- This same statement, perhaps minus the "effective in many areas", could be said for the NOPD in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. The NOPD had a major deficiency in leadership from Ray Nagin, the police chief, local and federal government, and FEMA. There was no game plan set forth before the storm, and as leaders scrambled to come up with one AFTER the storm hit, their delayed response caused the death of many New Orleans citizens. New Orleans police, although allegedly trained in natural disaster response, had a serious lack of planning and obviously not enough training to properly handle the chaotic conditions following the storm.
- "Many officers did not know who was in charge or whom they should report to after the attack. It also said that some officers in the field acted without direction from field commanders."
- Similarly, most NOPD officers were unaware of who to report to, or if they did, there little to no communication amongst the ranks. While many NYPD officers acted on their own judgement in a heroic fashion, rushing into burning buildings to save civilians, some NOPD officers took this severe lack of communication to mean that they had the ability to abuse their power to their liking. Many NOPD officers looted stores and homes, and some even took it a step further and committed acts as serious as murder, as in the Danziger Bridge shootings and the Henry Glover case.
- "The report, however, is measured in its findings, noting that no one could have anticipated Sept. 11 and that the department performed many tasks admirably. While leadership lapses, ineffective planning and a lack of coordination at the scene were among the most serious flaws, they did not affect what many considered to be the department's primary goal that day: the effective evacuation of the World Trade Center, saving thousands of lives."
- Here is an important distinction: THE OFFICERS OF THE NYPD HAD NO WARNING OF THE 9/11 ATTACKS. The NOPD officers were all clearly forewarned of the impending disaster, yet the NYPD were still able to handle their city's disaster in a much better manner. The main difference is that the NYPD officers did not let the chaotic conditions, lack of leadership, minimal communication, and poor planning distract them from their major goal: to protect and rescue the citizens of New York City. Where they were able to overcome these setbacks, many NOPD officers faltered. They allowed the conditions and poor planning to overcome what should have been their major goal: to protect and rescue the citizens of New Orleans.
- ''Every day police officers are faced with unimaginable situations, and every day they adapt and survive and do their jobs."- Senior Police Official, NYPD
- The NOPD were too faced with a horrific and unimaginable situation, but they were unable to properly adapt. There were some officers who did act heroically, and they should be thanked and appreciated to the fullest. But many more also forgot that it was THEIR JOB to serve and protect.
- "Despite what it called the perceived lack of a strong commander and confusion among some top officials, the report found overall that the department acted effectively in 10 of what it described as the 16 critical tasks, including the rescue of civilians, the evacuation of Lower Manhattan, traffic management, and the protection of sensitive locations around the city."
- Both NYPD officers and NOPD officers faced a lack of leadership and extremely confusing and chaotic environments, yet as evidenced by this independent analysis, the officers of the NYPD were able to overcome this in most areas. NOPD officers took advantage of this chaos to permeate the already damaged city with their corruption.
So, this analysis can be applied to the main issue: Should the choices that police officers make during a catastrophe be held to a different standard than those made in ideal conditions?
The NYPD proved that while a catastrophic event is always extremely difficult for disaster response officials, it is possible to overcome the chaotic conditions, fatigue, fear, uncertainty, lack of leadership, and poor planning, and show what it means to truly be heroes. They took the extremely abrupt and terrifying situation of 9/11 and performed with dignity and determination. They were able to unite the nation and illustrate a group of true American heroes. The NOPD had this same chance with Hurricane Katrina, yet they faltered. The storied corruption buried in the force was exposed, and instead of unifying Americans, they proved to them why Louisiana is one of the most corrupt states in our nation. In conclusion, the choices made by NOPD officers after Katrina should have consequences and should not simply be shrugged off as an effect of the storm. As citizens of New Orleans, we must stand up for transparency amongst our police officers. Because if there is another disaster even half as disastrous as Hurricane Katrina, we deserve the same help and determination as the citizens of New York City received from their police force after the September 11 terrorist attacks.
Tuesday, November 24, 2009
"Killing Ronald was like shooting down a child"- Lance Madison
Ronald Madison on the ground after he had been shot SEVEN times by police. Ronald was described as "having the mental capacity of a seven or eight year old child, gentle and never aggressive."
Source: http://www.thewe.cc/weplanet/news/americas/us/new_orleans_after_katrina.html
Seven N.O.P.D. officers were charged in the death of Ronald Madison and James Brissette, but their cases were dropped in 2006. However, a new federal investigation into the incident may prove that justice in New Orleans is truly possible.
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